In times of profound global instability, the Labour party continues to look toward one figure for intellectual leadership. More than fifteen years after stepping down from office, Gordon Brown has evolved into the party's most trusted elder statesman—a role he has maintained by declining lucrative private ventures and remaining steadfastly devoted to addressing humanity's most pressing challenges. His track record includes orchestrating the international response to the 2008 financial crisis and championing coordinated global action during the pandemic. Now, as geopolitical tensions mount and democratic institutions face mounting pressure, Brown has returned with a fresh diagnosis of why the world is fracturing and how it might be repaired.
His latest work, The Future Starts With Us, arrives just three years after his previous volume co-authored with economists Mohammed El-Erian and Michael Spence. The timing raises an obvious question: does Brown genuinely have new insights to offer, or does his prolific output reflect mounting frustration that global leaders have failed to heed his warnings? The answer proves to be both.
What makes this book different?
Where Brown's earlier work focused primarily on economic remedies, this volume shifts its emphasis toward the erosion of civic institutions and community bonds. His central argument rests on a striking observation: voters across developed democracies repeatedly express nostalgia for the stability and social cohesion of the 2000s, yet continue to elect populist leaders who promise disruption. To explore this paradox, Brown commissioned extensive polling research to test his hypothesis that citizens fundamentally desire a return to more orderly, cooperative governance.
The book's most distinctive contribution lies in its argument that the hollowing out of civic life—the decline in membership of clubs, trade unions, churches, and community organisations—has directly enabled the rise of populism at home and the collapse of multilateral cooperation abroad. Rather than treating these as separate crises, Brown contends they are manifestations of the same underlying fracture in the social fabric.
The very idea that we are all in this together, that there are common causes worth fighting for, he argues, has been systematically undermined.
This thesis draws on research Brown has been developing for some time. In a January 2026 seminar co-hosted with LSE President Larry Kramer, he explored how the weakening of civic institutions creates fertile ground for demagogues. More recently, Brown was appointed chair of the new Center for Civic Society at USC Schaeffer Institute, a role that has allowed him to develop and test these ideas on an international stage.
How does Brown connect local breakdown to global fragmentation?
The book's central insight is that the two crises reinforce each other in a vicious circle. When communities lose their civic anchors, residents feel isolated and anxious. This psychological vulnerability makes them susceptible to populist messaging that blames distant elites and foreign threats. Simultaneously, populist governments elected on these grievances destabilise the international order, making it harder for any nation to build stable, prosperous economies. The result is accelerating decline that feeds further resentment and further populism.
Brown acknowledges that this argument risks sounding nostalgic or even reactionary—a romanticisation of a past when social bonds were stronger but women's unpaid domestic labour was the hidden foundation of community life. Yet he updates the thesis by connecting it to contemporary challenges: the fraying of social ties in post-industrial towns now leaning toward populist politicians is directly linked to fragmentation and the retreat from multilateralism on the world stage. Breaking this cycle, he suggests, requires simultaneous action on both fronts.
What is Brown's proposed solution?
Rather than top-down intervention, Brown proposes building what he calls a virtuous circle from the ground up. By strengthening civic participation—encouraging people to join organisations that demand genuine commitment and foster face-to-face interaction across lines of difference—societies can rebuild the trust and sense of common purpose necessary for collaborative governance. This renewed social cohesion would, in theory, make electorates more receptive to governments acting generously and cooperatively at the international level, enabling coordinated responses to climate change, global poverty, and geopolitical rivalry.
The framework offers clear political advantages. It provides a unifying narrative through which a Labour government could connect seemingly disparate policy areas—from high street regeneration to foreign policy—and build support both in post-industrial regions and among urban progressives. For a foreign secretary capable of thinking strategically, the approach suggests ways to integrate international relations much more closely with domestic renewal.
What does the polling reveal?
To test his theory, Brown commissioned polling of 32,000 respondents across 20 developed nations, from Argentina to South Korea. The research distinguishes between "zero sum" thinkers—people convinced they can only prosper if others lose, shaping their views on trade, immigration, and international cooperation—and a more generous "civic core" willing to accept compromise for collective benefit. In the United Kingdom, the civic core still outnumbers zero-sum thinkers, with a substantial middle group that Brown believes could be persuaded toward more cooperative attitudes.
However, the polling cited in the book represents only part of Brown's broader research effort. According to the John Smith Centre, the work draws on original polling of nearly 100,000 people across 45 countries—a significantly larger dataset than the 32,000 figure mentioned in the text. Brown then models the impact of specific interventions: reducing economic grievances, increasing face-to-face contact between people of different religious and racial backgrounds, and strengthening civic institutions. The conclusion is that deploying these measures together could substantially reduce susceptibility to populist appeals.
Where does the argument fall short?
Brown's prescription for restoring the international rules-based order proves less convincing. He proposes a new universal charter to which responsible nations could commit, yet the world already possesses numerous grand statements of principle and enforcement bodies—the International Criminal Court, the Paris climate accords, the United Nations system—that fail because governments lack the political will to comply. Creating additional institutional frameworks addresses a symptom rather than the underlying problem of state behaviour.
More fundamentally, Brown's vision of civic renewal rests on a particular model of community engagement: the muscular, time-intensive volunteering that builds character and teaches active citizenship. Yet the very organisations he sees as capable of this work—trade unions, churches, fraternal societies—have largely disappeared. The book offers little guidance on how to rebuild them or whether modern forms of association might serve similar functions. For many contemporary Britons, leisure time spent scrolling on social media rather than attending committee meetings represents a genuine choice, not a failure of moral imagination.
Brown himself acknowledges this tension, arguing that cynicism about the feasibility of his vision is itself part of the problem. If progressive politics is to compete with populism, he contends, it cannot confine itself to incremental reform—it must
show it can make the desirable possible. Whether that aspiration represents visionary leadership or wishful thinking remains an open question.
What is most compelling in the book?
Unusually for Brown, the strongest material emerges not from grand theorising about globalisation or the rise of China, but from reflections on neighbourhood-level engagement. After decades spent navigating the highest levels of international politics, Brown writes that he has only recently come to appreciate the power of starting small. In his own constituency of Kirkcaldy, he remains deeply involved with local charities and community initiatives—a hands-on commitment that grounds his theoretical arguments in lived experience.
What happens next?
Brown is scheduled to discuss the book at a series of public events. On 2 September 2026, he will appear at the University of Glasgow from 7:00–9:00pm in conversation with Eddie Barnes, exploring the book's themes with a focus on civic renewal and democratic resilience. A week later, on 10 September 2026, he will participate in a live conversation at the Royal Geographical Society in London, with a livestream option available for remote audiences. These events will provide opportunities for Brown to elaborate on his diagnosis and respond to critics who question whether civic revival alone can counter the economic and geopolitical forces driving populism.
