A comprehensive public inquiry into the Lucy Letby case has identified serious shortcomings that extend far beyond the Countess of Chester Hospital, revealing deep structural problems across the entire English health system that allowed criminality to flourish unchecked. The Thirlwall inquiry's final report, published on 15 September 2026 in Liverpool, documented a "complete failure" to protect babies on the neonatal unit where Letby murdered seven infants and attempted to murder seven others.
One of the senior doctors who raised concerns about Letby has now reflected on the findings. Consultant paediatrician Dr John Gibbs, who worked at the hospital throughout 2015 to 2016 when the crimes occurred, described the inquiry report as "grim reading" and acknowledged that medical staff bore "collective" responsibility for some failures. "I wish we consultants had been brave enough to follow our suspicions and escalate things to the police earlier," he told a national broadcaster. "When I say, 'we consultants', I am responsible as well and if my other consultant colleagues didn't go to the police, I should have."
More than 200 pages of the report examined the wider systemic failures that created conditions enabling such crimes to persist. Lady Justice Thirlwall set out in detail how the culture embedded within the health system—from regulation and employment practices to how the NHS and government learn from past crises—systematically failed to prevent harm. The findings have prompted Health Secretary Yvette Cooper to pledge she "will not hesitate" to hold the system accountable at every level. She announced the creation of a new maternity and neonatal commissioner post and committed to establishing a hub to monitor implementation of the inquiry's recommendations. "This must be a turning point for the NHS," she told Parliament when the report was released.
According to reporting from a major international news agency, the inquiry concluded that some babies would have been saved if hospital managers had acted sooner on the concerns raised by medical staff.
How did reputation management culture enable the failures?
The inquiry identified an entrenched culture of blame avoidance within NHS management that prioritised protecting institutional reputation over patient safety. Managers became preoccupied with avoiding accountability, leading to what the inquiry termed an "over-focus on process and reputation management." One witness characterised this approach as "blame engineering," and the inquiry found that senior leaders at the Countess of Chester treated the Letby case as an "exercise in spin" rather than a genuine safeguarding crisis.
This defensive posture made it extremely difficult for staff to raise concerns without fear of retaliation. The inquiry noted that despite various initiatives over the years—including the Freedom to Speak Up programme, which assigns a guardian in each NHS organisation to support whistleblowers—the system has largely become a "box ticking" exercise in many places. Data from the NHS staff survey revealed declining confidence among employees in speaking out, with a persistent "toxic negativity" surrounding whistleblowing that actively discourages staff from reporting problems.
Dr Gibbs reflected on the difficult atmosphere that persisted after Letby was moved off the unit but before police involvement. "It was a very difficult atmosphere, very tense, very stressful dealing with the managers," he explained. Hospital executives "were determined to ensure that we accepted Lucy Letby had been wrongly suspected of doing any harm," he added, describing how this defensive stance made it harder for medical staff to pursue their concerns.
Why do failing managers escape accountability?
The inquiry identified a consistent inability within the NHS to address poor management performance. Rather than holding failing managers to account, NHS trusts and NHS England have developed a practice of moving underperforming leaders to other positions—a process referred to informally as rehabilitation. The Countess of Chester's former chief executive, Tony Chambers, described this system as "the donkey sanctuary."
The report highlighted that some failing managers receive financial settlements and move to other roles "with few questions asked," as NHS trusts fear costly employment tribunal claims. While acknowledging that many NHS managers perform excellently, the inquiry stressed that profound change is essential in how the health system addresses management failure. The government has proposed introducing a barring service to prevent unsuitable managers from working in the NHS, but the inquiry cautioned that such measures will prove ineffective if the system continues to enable poor performers to move between organisations without scrutiny.
How did regulators miss warning signs?
Regulatory oversight has been found significantly wanting. The Care Quality Commission inspected the Countess of Chester in February 2016, yet Letby continued attacking babies until June of that year. Although key information was withheld from inspectors, the regulator was criticised for failing to demonstrate sufficient curiosity and for accepting explanations without deeper investigation.
This weakness was particularly troubling given that just one year earlier, a separate inquiry into baby deaths at Morecambe Bay NHS Trust had warned the CQC that it needed to adopt a more rigorous approach. The Thirlwall inquiry found that regulatory weaknesses have persisted. An independent review conducted in 2024 warned that the CQC's ability to identify poor performance had by that point begun to deteriorate. The CQC has since acknowledged it was not sufficiently investigative or inquisitive in 2016 and stated it has strengthened its approach, though the inquiry's findings suggest systemic problems remain.
The Nursing and Midwifery Council, which regulates nurses, was similarly criticised for insufficient curiosity. The council renewed Letby's registration at a time when she was prohibited from working on a ward and a police investigation was underway.
Why have lessons from previous scandals not been learned?
The inquiry examined a troubling pattern: over three decades, numerous inquiries into NHS failures have generated thousands of recommendations, yet most have never been implemented. When implementation has occurred, it has often taken years, and progress has rarely been tracked systematically. The inquiry attributed this failure to a combination of insufficient political will and disruption caused by repeated structural reorganisations of the health service.
This failure to learn from history had potentially grave consequences in the Letby case. The inquiry highlighted the medical examiner system as a critical example. This system, whereby an independent doctor reviews deaths not examined by a coroner to ensure the certifying doctor has no conflict of interest, was first recommended in 2003 following the Harold Shipman murders inquiry. It was called for again in 2013 as part of the inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust's failures. Yet it was not introduced until 2024. Former Health Secretary Sir Jeremy Hunt told the inquiry that had this system been in place earlier, it would have prevented multiple deaths at the Countess of Chester.
What role did medical staff play in the failures?
Dr Gibbs acknowledged that consultants themselves bore responsibility for some of the systemic failures. He spoke of collective team failures, specifically referencing a doctor who disregarded blood test results that suggested a baby had been poisoned with insulin in August 2015. While one colleague had missed the relevance of the results when they came back from the laboratory, it had been a collective team failure, he concluded. "Others of us were on call and covering the neonatal unit over the next week or two before the baby moved out of the unit. We all had the opportunity to review the notes," he said.
Reflecting on the findings, Dr Gibbs said: "I wasn't expecting it to be an easy read and it certainly isn't. I'd imagine it's an extremely difficult read for the parents of the babies concerned. As I admitted when I appeared before the inquiry to give evidence, I feel we failed the babies and I apologise to the families for that." He agreed with the report's finding that hospital executives had multiple opportunities to act and potentially save babies' lives while the deaths were happening.
What happens next?
The UK government has announced immediate actions on neonatal cot-cams, NHS manager accountability, stronger inspections, safeguarding reforms, and a single tracker for maternity and neonatal review recommendations. The government said it will publish its full response to the inquiry's recommendations after completing detailed consideration of each finding.
The case continues to generate legal proceedings beyond the inquiry. Cheshire Constabulary said its corporate manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter investigation is continuing, with no set timescales. Additionally, the Criminal Cases Review Commission is still considering whether Letby's convictions are safe, though no published timetable has been set for a decision.
Dr Gibbs said that the continuing support for Letby had taken a toll on him and other consultants, and that claims she had been wrongly convicted were "frustrating and difficult" to hear. "I particularly find the misinformation that's on the internet is difficult to deal with," he said. However, he emphasised that, because of the "calibre of some of the people who've raised concerns," it is "important" that the evidence used to convict Letby is being examined by the independent review body. "I haven't changed my mind that I think Lucy Letby is guilty," he added.
Letby is serving 15 whole-life prison terms for murdering seven babies and attempting to murder seven more. She was convicted in 2023 and has twice been denied permission to appeal against her convictions.
