Why was his case described as ‘borderline’ and was national security at risk during his ambassadorship?
Since revealed that Peter Mandelson was granted security clearance despite the UK government’s vetting agency advising against it, a central question has emerged in Westminster.
What specific concerns led United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) to recommend denying Mandelson clearance in late January 2025, just weeks before he was scheduled to assume his role as ambassador to Washington?
On Wednesday, several sources disclosed multiple factors that contributed to UKSV’s decision.
UKSV identified concerns regarding Mandelson’s associations with several individuals: the Chinese finance minister Lan Fo’an, the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and a former Israeli military intelligence general, Tamir Hayman, according to sources. The agency also highlighted a very close relationship with a fourth individual, a British national, which it considered potentially compromising.
Additionally, officials flagged a £1 million loan Mandelson used to purchase shares in an Israeli startup. They also noted his apparent naivety about the risks that his historical relationships with these individuals might be exploited.
These revelations prompt further questions for those involved in the expanding controversy surrounding Mandelson’s appointment, including Olly Robbins, who approved his ambassadorship, and senior civil servants responsible for granting his clearance.
1. Was it appropriate to grant Mandelson security clearance?
On 28 January 2025, UKSV completed its vetting process, concluding that Mandelson represented a “high” overall concern and recommended that clearance be denied. However, the following day, Olly Robbins, then permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, granted clearance regardless.
Robbins did not review UKSV’s nine-page summary of Mandelson’s vetting file. Instead, he relied on an oral briefing from Ian Collard, a senior Foreign Office official who had not seen the summary either. Robbins also received an oral briefing from another member of his team. Corin Robertson, the Foreign Office’s chief operating officer at the time, was also involved in the decision.
Given the extensive concerns identified by UKSV, was the decision by Robbins, Collard, and Robertson to grant Mandelson clearance with “mitigations” justified?
2. What were the ‘mitigations’ and where are the related documents?
Robbins informed MPs last month that his decision to grant clearance was contingent upon mitigations designed to manage the risks identified by UKSV. However, the nature of these mitigations remains unclear. Did they sufficiently address Mandelson’s connections to individuals in China, Russia, Israel, and the UK, as well as the £1 million loan?
Last week, MP John Hayes, a member of the intelligence and security committee with early access to the most sensitive Mandelson files, raised a notable point in the House of Commons. He asked government minister Darren Jones to confirm whether “there was no document or any communication” concerning mitigation of any risks related to Mandelson.
In response, Jones mentioned mitigations related to commercial interests. However, these appear to be separate and do not address all the risks identified by UKSV.
Is it plausible that no government documents exist recording the mitigations Robbins and Collard assert were implemented?
3. Was national security compromised during Mandelson’s seven-month tenure?
The government has stated that a review is underway to determine whether any security concerns arose during Mandelson’s time as the UK ambassador in Washington.
This audit may examine whether his associations with Lan Fo’an, Oleg Deripaska, Tamir Hayman, and other issues raised by UKSV presented conflicts of interest. Did Mandelson’s relationships influence official discussions related to China, Russia, or Israel during his ambassadorship?
While the vetting process was ongoing in January 2025, Mandelson reportedly received sensitive Foreign Office briefings on China. Were officials aware of his links to Lan at that time? Furthermore, was Mandelson involved in any capacity in meetings between Lan and Rachel Reeves, the Chancellor, in early 2025?
4. Why was a £1 million loan not declared in the House of Lords register of interests?
In July 2019, Mandelson declared in the House of Lords register of interests that he held shares valued at more than £50,000 in Moon Active. However, he did not disclose a £1 million loan, which sources say UKSV noted was provided by a British businessman to enable him to purchase shares in the company.
Peers are required to disclose all relevant financial interests “which might be thought by a reasonable member of the public to influence a member’s parliamentary conduct.” Why then was this loan not declared?
5. Why did Robbins describe Mandelson’s case as ‘borderline’?
Robbins stated he was briefed by Collard that UKSV considered Mandelson’s case “borderline.” Collard told MPs he recalled it as a “borderline case,” but acknowledged that those directly involved “cannot remember with certainty exactly what phraseology was used.” The term “borderline” has not been used by any other individuals who have seen the UKSV documents.
Was Mandelson’s case, involving connections to two senior figures embedded in the power structures of hostile states, truly “borderline”? Who made that assessment, and when and where was it documented?
