Supreme Court Examines Privacy Implications of Geofence Warrants
The US Supreme Court is currently deliberating on whether broad warrants for smartphone location data infringe upon Americans’ privacy rights and violate the Constitution.
On Monday, justices heard opening arguments in Chatrie v United States, a case addressing law enforcement’s use of so-called “geofence warrants” in complex investigations. The case originated from the actions of Okello Chatrie, whose phone location data enabled police in Richmond, Virginia, to track him after he robbed a bank at gunpoint and fled with $195,000 in 2019. Chatrie pleaded guilty to armed robbery and received a 12-year prison sentence, but his defense contends that the evidence obtained through his phone data should have been inadmissible in court.
Government’s Position on Privacy Expectations
A lawyer representing the US Department of Justice argued that actions taken in public while carrying a smartphone do not carry an expectation of privacy.
“An individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements that anyone could see, that he has opted to allow a third party to analyze for its own purposes,”
stated the US solicitor general, a senior attorney from Donald Trump’s administration, in legal filings.
Use of Geofence Warrants by Law Enforcement
Law enforcement agencies request that technology companies provide sensitive phone location data for individuals present at or near a crime scene, encompassing anyone within a virtual “geofence.” Unlike traditional warrants targeting specific individuals, geofence warrants compel companies to disclose data on every electronic device within a designated area at a particular time.
Privacy advocates and some legal experts criticize geofence searches as broad sweeps that capture innocent bystanders. Paul Ohm, a Georgetown University law professor who submitted an amicus brief in the case, questioned,
“Just because you have a cell phone, should you be subjected to all sorts of law enforcement investigations because of crimes that may have happened in your vicinity?”
He further explained that these warrants may result in a person’s phone location data being shared with police simply because they “were in the wrong place at the wrong time, or even worse – you weren’t, but your phone thought you were.”
Law Enforcement’s Defense of Geofence Warrants
Prosecutors and officers argue that geofence warrants are vital tools for solving crimes when other leads have been exhausted. Justice Brett Kavanaugh expressed concerns about the consequences of being unable to solve serious crimes such as murders.
Details of the Chatrie Case and Data Collection
Chatrie had enabled Google’s optional “location history” feature, which recorded his location every few minutes. Government filings noted that only about one-third of active Google account holders have opted into this service; Chatrie’s lawyers highlighted that this still represents over 500 million Google users.
After interviewing witnesses and reviewing security footage from the bank robbery, investigators lacked leads. They submitted a geofence warrant request to Google for phone location data covering a 30-minute window before and after the robbery, targeting all devices within 150 meters of the bank. This request yielded Chatrie’s phone data along with information on 19 other accounts. The detective sought additional data on all these individuals, but Google resisted, resulting in a narrowed request for nine people. Eventually, the investigation focused on three devices, one belonging to Chatrie, with an associated email address bearing his name.
The US government maintains that Chatrie consented to Google’s collection and use of his location data, and that investigators identified him through a valid warrant. However, Chatrie’s attorneys argue the warrant was excessively broad.
Changes in Google’s Geofencing Policies and Broader Implications
Since Chatrie’s arrest, Google has altered its geofencing policies by transferring location data from its servers to users’ devices, limiting its ability to comply with geofence warrants as before, according to Matthew Tokson, a law professor at the University of Utah. Nevertheless, the government increasingly seeks this data directly from cellular providers and other companies. The Electronic Privacy Information Center emphasized that the case impacts privacy protections for data stored in cloud services and collected by consumer applications.
Privacy advocates caution that the case’s implications extend beyond criminal investigations. Tokson warned,
“If the government doesn’t need to get a warrant or link something to a crime, it could monitor a protest or an abortion clinic or a gun range or a church or an AA meeting or a doctor’s office.”
Several justices also expressed concern about the broader privacy consequences.
Ohm noted,
“If the court rules that a geofence warrant doesn’t constitute a search by law enforcement, our privacy rights might be completely eviscerated. It would lead to a lot of unregulated police activity.”
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable search and seizure.” Both Ohm and Tokson sensed from the justices’ remarks that some may consider geofence warrants to be searches, which could provide relief to privacy advocates.
Justice Sotomayor’s Remarks on Location Data Privacy
Justice Sonia Sotomayor expressed skepticism about the government’s claim that short-term location data reveals little about an individual’s life patterns. She illustrated how people carry their phones everywhere, including private locations such as bathrooms, cannabis shops, and brothels.
“It really doesn’t matter … whether it’s a minute that you’re searching for or six weeks, it’s not the time that’s an issue – it’s whether or not private information in which you have a reasonable expectation of privacy will be sought,”
she said.
