Gulf States Express Concerns to US Amid Iran’s Proxy Influence
As the US Secretary of State concluded his brief visit to the Middle East on Friday, he aimed to present his discussions with Gulf state leaders in a positive light. These leaders remain deeply concerned that the recent deal between the US and Iran does not adequately address their apprehensions regarding Iran’s ongoing efforts to project power and influence across the region.
“They’ve shared with us some very concrete concerns,”
the US secretary of state acknowledged, emphasizing that any final agreement must require Tehran not only to limit its nuclear program but also to cease support for Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
However, analysts and Western security officials anticipate that Iran is likely to increase its backing of such groups following the conflict, which has reinforced much of Tehran’s strategic outlook.
They also predict an intensification of activities by irregular fighters funded and armed by Israel and, to a lesser extent, the US.
Hezbollah’s Role and Iran’s Commitment
Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s coalition of allied groups and proxies throughout the Middle East, despite suffering significant losses during prolonged clashes with Israel in 2024 and 2025. The militant Islamist organization notably failed in its primary strategic role for Iran: deterring a direct Israeli strike.
Nonetheless, Tehran remains steadfast in its support of Hezbollah, which was established in Lebanon over 40 years ago with the assistance of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
“The Iranians see this as a temporary bad phase and believe Hezbollah will regenerate … It is absolutely vital for the Revolutionary Guards to rebuild their proxies around the region and to control their decisions,”
said Hanin Ghaddar, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
By making the ceasefire between Iran and the US contingent on an end to fighting in Lebanon, Iran has heightened tensions between Israel, which seeks to continue its offensive against Hezbollah, and Washington.
Houthis’ Role in Yemen and Regional Impact
The Houthis in Yemen, who maintain close ties with Tehran, joined the recent conflict only in its final days but demonstrated their capacity to target Israel—though causing limited damage—and to threaten international shipping through the Red Sea. Despite their connections, they maintain a degree of independence from their primary sponsors.
“The [Houthis] are very hardcore and were useful during the war but … have their own decision-making processes that don’t involve the Iranians,”
Ghaddar explained.
Iran-Supported Shia Militias in Iraq
In Iraq, Shia militias nurtured and supported by Iran for over two decades displayed their capabilities during the conflict but did not deploy their full offensive strength. These groups claimed responsibility for dozens of drone and rocket attacks against US assets in Iraq and targeted Kuwait, yet they refrained from mass mobilization. Lethal retaliatory airstrikes and complex domestic Iraqi politics contributed to many faction leaders’ caution in escalating conflict with the US.
“They are more risk-averse than perhaps the Iranians would like,”
said Michael Knights, an expert on Iraqi militias at Horizon Engage, a global political risk consultancy.
Iran also utilized Shia militias in Iraq to target Kurdish groups, aiming to deter their active participation in the war. However, the Kurds had independent reasons for avoiding commitment.
US and Israeli Efforts to Mobilize Ethnic Minorities
At the outset of the conflict with Iran in January, the US and Israel attempted to mobilize armed groups among Iran’s ethnic minorities, including Arabs from southwest Iran and the Baloch in the southeast. These efforts were unsuccessful.
“There were general contacts [with these communities] but they did not develop,”
said Michael Milshtein, a former intelligence officer and current analyst at Tel Aviv University.
Similarly, the US-Israeli strategy involving Kurdish factions based in northern Iraq did not succeed despite their historical ties with both countries.
Longstanding US Plan Involving Kurdish Fighters
Former senior Kurdish and US military officials revealed that a longstanding US plan, prepared in case of war, involved several thousand lightly armed Kurdish fighters crossing into northwest Iran accompanied by US special forces. Protected by US and Israeli air power, these fighters would advance rapidly to destabilize Tehran’s regime and incite uprisings elsewhere. Iran’s conventional military and paramilitary forces were expected to counter the Kurdish advance, exposing them to devastating air raids.
Those familiar with the plan, described as being “on the shelf” for over 20 years, have differing opinions on its potential success. One former US special forces adviser with extensive regional experience stated that a Kurdish force with embedded US special forces could have
“gone through Iran like a buzz saw”but another believed progress beyond Kurdish-dominated regions in the northwest would have been difficult or impossible.
Ultimately, only “a few hundred” fighters were available for immediate deployment, and Kurdish leaders were cautious of the US following what they perceived as a “betrayal” in Syria weeks earlier, when Washington supported a deal that brought Kurdish civilian and military authorities under central government control.
Both US and Kurdish former officials noted the plan required a 12 to 24-month preparation period to train sufficient fighters, distribute weapons, and establish unified Kurdish command, whereas the White House appeared to believe it could be implemented within days.
A significant factor was strong personal opposition from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which influenced former US President Donald Trump to reconsider the plan after several days during which Israeli warplanes attacked Iranian police stations, barracks, and border posts to facilitate Kurdish group incursions.
Israeli Intelligence and New Militias
In addition to their connections with Kurdish groups, Israeli intelligence services have established ties with a new Druze militia in Syria. The Military Council was created to protect the vulnerable religious minority, according to Israeli military officials last week. Experts note that this militia will also resist the consolidation of the new Syrian government’s authority in their regions, aligning with Israeli interests.
Palestinian Militias in Israel
In Israel, a series of Palestinian militias have been developed to combat Hamas, which has reasserted control over the 2.3 million Palestinians living outside the 60% or more of territory occupied by Israel.
These militias have engaged in actions against Hamas and undertaken other “very limited” tactical operations, but with mixed results.
“They will in no way change the strategic situation in Gaza … They have zero popular support and … absolutely cannot be an alternative to Hamas,”
Milshtein stated.
Regional Push to Disarm Militias Amid Proxy Risks
Across the region, there is a concerted effort to disarm militias and strengthen state authority to counter growing instability. Despite this, the temptation to employ proxies persists, notwithstanding the evident risks. Recent and ongoing conflicts in Syria, Libya, Sudan, and other countries have all witnessed extensive use of proxy forces.
“You can’t rely on proxies. They are not just useless,”
Milshtein concluded.
“They cause damage.”
